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INTRODUCTION

Many states are currently struggling with the outdated water
allocation system of riparianism. The riparian method of allocation' requires persons wishing to acquire water rights to locate
adjacent to a water source. This system no longer meets states'
increasingly complex needs.
More frequent droughts and the growing demand 2 for water
have combined to make the riparian water allocation system inad1. For a discussion on riparianism, see infra notes 17-29 and accompanying
text.
2. Increased demand for water has resulted from population growth, high
per capita use, and population concentration in urban areas. Richard C. Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191
(1977). In addition:
[e]xpanding municipal and industrial demand, along with increasing
use of supplemental irrigation, have escalated consumptive water use
dramatically in the Eastern United States since World War II. This escalated use already has caused water shortages in some parts of the
East, and experts predict more widespread water supply problems in
the future.
Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor Reform, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1983) [hereinafter Ausness]. Water's several uses
often compete for attention, putting stress on the water supply. Some of the
consumptive uses of water include: agriculture, domestic, commercial, and public facilities. 1 ROBERT E. BECK, WATERS AND WATER RiciHrs 29-36 (Robert E.
Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter BECK]. While some of water's non-consumptive
uses include: recreation, wildlife, navigation, hydropower, and waste disposal.
Id. at 36-37. Because these many uses strain the water distribution system, especially in times of drought, and because of the relatively small amount of water,
water must be allocated between these dueling uses. For a general discussion of
water's scarcity and the need for an allocation system, see CHARLES W. HOWE,
WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 53 (David H. Getches ed., 1988) [hereinafter

HOWE]. A water allocation system must lessen the effects of scarcity. Some field
practitioners suggest that there will continue to be a problem until emphasis is
taken off supply and put on demand. TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER RIGHTS 2
(1983) [hereinafter ANDERSON]. By raising prices, water use per person has leveled off, and in some cases declined. Id. at 2-3. However, the same practitioners
also believe that this type of demand management is not likely to occur because
political agencies set water prices. Id.
Others reason that scarcity can be dealt with by comparing water supply
development to the uses of existing supplies. See HOWE, at 53. Comparison involves more than a cost-benefit analysis. Environmental objectives such as species preservation and social objectives such as protecting traditional cultures
must be included in the water policy evaluation. Id. The courts and state legislatures must use an equitable and consistent method for allocating water between
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equate.3 By requiring water users to determine rights through
litigation, riparianism lacks predictability. In addition, because
riparianism fails to allocate water prospectively, allocation among
competing users is inefficient and wasteful. 4 Moreover, users are
unable to rely on availability in times of great need. Finally, as
society has expanded and moved away from water sources, a system which allocates based upon proximity to a water source is no
5
longer practical.
The inadequacies of riparianism will require states to develop new allocation systems. Consequently, many states have
enacted comprehensive water legislation. 6 In Pennsylvania, the
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) has proposed
comprehensive water legislation. 7 Although water traditionally
has not been a scarce resource in Pennsylvania,8 the state needs a
comprehensive water allocation system to efficiently and effectively meet users' needs.
This article first analyzes current water law in Pennsylvania,
focusing upon the inadequacies of the riparian system. Next, it
examines the viability of other states' water systems which include
prior appropriation, dual (hybrid) systems, permit systems, and
comprehensive regulation. Moreover, the article argues that a
comprehensive regulated system is the most efficient and effective
water allocation system for Pennsylvania and similarly situated
states. Finally, the article examines DER's proposal for legislation in Pennsylvania, and its potential impact on various interest
groups including agriculture, water companies, domestic and
commercial water users, thermoelectric power users, industry,
the various users. The scarcity of water must be dealt with because there is not
enough water to meet existing demands. ANDERSON, at 1.
3. For a discussion of the inadequacies of riparianism in general, see infra
notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
4. Riparianism is inefficient in that it fails to effectively allocate water
among present users based on need. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying
text. In addition, riparianism fails to efficiently allocate water between present
and future uses. To address this problem, many states have adopted constitutional amendments which require conservation and protection of water resources. See infra note 42. However, these states often have not fulfilled their
obligation under these provisions. Id.
5. It is not practical for all water users to locate themselves next to water
sources and modern technology no longer requires it.
6. For the states that have adopted comprehensive regulation, see infra note

145.
7. For the text and discussion of the proposal, see infra notes 174-98 and
accompanying text.
8. As a result, there has not been a tremendous urgency toward developing
a modern water allocation method.
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II.

WATER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA

Water law in Pennsylvania is an unusual mixture of old and
new.' 0 It is close to a "pure riparian" system of water allocation
because of its heavy reliance upon the common law." However,
the state has superimposed a limited number of regulatory stat12
utes upon this antiquated riparian foundation.
Although DER13 enforces many of the state water statutes, it
is not the sole agency responsible for administering water law.
The authority over water allocation and use lies with a number of
agencies including the Delaware River Basin Commission, 14 the
Susquehanna River Basin Commission,' 5 and the Public Utility
Commission.' 6 The following sections will discuss the various aspects of water law in Pennsylvania as it currently exists.
A.

Riparianism

Riparianism is a legal method of allocating and enforcing
water rights through the common law. 17 Riparian rights arise
9. For a discussion of the impact of comprehensive regulation on the various interest groups, see infra notes 199-253 and accompanying text.
10. Pennsylvania water law is unusual because a majority of eastern states
have adopted a regulated riparian system. See infra note 145. In Pennsylvania,
common law is still the primary basis of water allocation. See infra notes 146-51
and accompanying text.

11. 6 JOSEPH

W. DELLAPENNA,

WATER AND WATER RIGHTS

363 (Robert E.

Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS]. Because Pennsylvania has some statutes and administrative bodies controlling water allocation, it is not a "pure riparian" system. However, it is closer to a pure system
than most other states because of its lack of centralized authority and legislation.
Id.
12. Timothy Weston &Joseph R. Gray, Legal Controlof Consumptive Water Use
in Pennsylvania Power Plants, 80 DICK. L. REV. 353, 363 & n.67 (1976).
13. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510-8 (1990).
14. Delaware River Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.101-.106 (1967 &
Supp. 1991).
15. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 820.1-.8
(Supp. 1991).
16. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102-1314 (1979 & Supp. 1991). There also
exists an Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact. The Ohio River Valley
Water Sanitation Commission, however, does not hold the broad powers of the
Delaware Commission or the Susquehanna Commission. 32 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 816.1-.7 (1967 & Supp. 1991).
17. Riparianism developed from English and American common law. I JoSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 207 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991)
[hereinafter DELLAPENNA]. However, there is some conflict over its exact origin.
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from the ownership of land bordering on lakes or streams.' 8
Neighboring riparian owners have equal rights amongst themselves to use water. 19 Among water uses under the riparian rights
doctrine, domestic uses are considered most important.2 0 After
domestic uses, equal priority is given to irrigation, and to industrial and commercial uses. 2 ' Lastly, the diversion of water for use
22
off riparian land is accorded the lowest priority.
Before riparian rights vest in a landowner, the land must
qualify as riparian. Land qualifies as riparian if it touches a water
body, is within the relevant watershed, and meets one of two tests
regarding title.2 3 After determining that the land is riparian,
there are two theories to establish a landowner's right to use
water. The two theories are the reasonable use and natural flow
24
theories.
"The debate over the source of riparian rights doctrine will continue to be important." Id.
18. See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 21 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
GOLDFARB]. The basic requirement for land to be riparian is for the land to be in
contact with the water. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 220. For a discussion of
the tests to determine whether land is riparian, see infra note 23 and accompanying text. Riparianism is found predominantly in the East. See Ausness, supra
note 2, at 548. However, most eastern states have also supplemented riparianism with the permit system. See GOLDFARB, supra 18 at 21.
19. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 218.

20. PENNSYLVANIA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, WATER RESOURCE
SYLVANIA: AVAILABILITY, QUALITY AND MANAGEMENT 222 (Majumdar,
Parizek 1990) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA].

IN

PENN-

Miller and

21. Id. Commericial and industrial uses are sometimes referred to as extraordinary uses. Id. See also Palmer v. Lehighton, 124 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1924).
In Pennsylvania, these priorities are subject to emergency regulatory
schemes by the basin commissions which may preempt a riparian land owner's
rights. WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 222. For a discussion of the basin commissions, see infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
22. Id.
23. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17 at 220. The two title tests are the restrictive
,source of title' test and the more inclusive 'unity of title' test. For a detailed
discussion of the two riparian title tests, see Id. at 223-24. See also GOLDFARB,
supra note 18, at 22. Under the 'source of title' theory, riparian rights are limited
to the smallest parcel held under one title in a chain of title that has never been
severed from a water body. Id. This test is burdensome because it requires extensive title searches. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 224. Furthermore, under
this test, the amount of land possessing riparian rights shrinks each time a tract
is subdivided or sold. GOLDFARB, supra note 18, at 22.
Under the 'unity of title' theory, riparian rights belong to the owner of land
held in a single title bordering a watercourse. Id. This is the more inclusive of
the two tests because riparian land increases as parcels adjacent to existing riparian tracts are acquired. Id.
24. Id. Originally riparian rights were defined by the 'natural flow' doctrine, however, since 'natural flow' is anti-development it has been replaced with
the 'reasonable use' rule. Id. at 22-23. Under the natural flow theory each riparian owner was entitled to have water flow across or rest on his land in its natural
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25
A majority of jurisdictions use the reasonable use theory.

Under this theory, each riparian landowner may use water for any
beneficial purpose if reasonable with respect to other riparian
needs and if the use does not interfere unreasonably with other
legitimate riparian water uses. 2 6 Water rights are interdependent
among riparian owners, and are not based on a benefit to a single
user.2 7 The reasonable use theory requires courts to weigh the
benefit of one use against the benefit of another inconsistent use
to determine what is reasonable. 28 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts lists modern factors which courts can use to decide whether
29
a particular use is reasonable in relation to other uses.
condition, without interference by others. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 233. A
change in the rate of flow or the quantity or quality of the water constitutes
interference.
Chancellor Kent stated that: "[e]very proprietor of lands on the banks of a
river, has naturally an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the
stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run (currere solebat) without diminution or alteration." Eva M. Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS
L. REV. 621, 628-29 (1968) (quoting 3 KENT, COMMENTARIES 439 (2d ed. 1832)).

The reasonable use theory was first developed in the eastern states. Early
riparian theory was based on three premises: (1) a right to receive water in its
natural condition; (2) equal rights against every other riparian owner; and (3) a
right to make reasonable use of water as it flowed across, by, or lay upon the
land. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 241. During "the Industrial Revolution...
these three uses were incompatible [with each other], and courts moved rapidly,
explicitly or tacitly, to abandon the supposed right of riparian landowners to
receive the natural flow of a waterbody." Id.
25. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 241.

26. Ausness, supra note 2, at 549. "Each riparian owner has a right to divert
water for any purpose if the use is reasonable with respect to other riparians."
GOLDFARB, supra note 18, at 23. Under the reasonable use rule, a landowner can
alter the drainage on the land in any way as long as the altered drainage does not
unreasonably injure neighboring land. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Legal Regulation of Diffused Surface Water, 2 VILL. ENVT'L. L.J. 285, 314 (1991) [hereinafter
Dellapenna, Legal Resolution].
27. GOLDFARB, supra note 18, at 23.

28. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 251. One of the earlier enumerations of
the considerations to determine reasonableness is found in the case Red River
Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249 (1883). The Minnesota court stated in pertinent part, as follows:
In determining what is reasonable use, regard must be had to the subject-matter of the use; the occasion and manner of its application; the
object, extent, necessity, and duration of the use; the nature and size of
the stream; ...

the importance and necessity of the use claimed by one

party .... the extent of the injury to the other party; [and] the state of
improvement of the country in regard to mills and machinery. ...
Id. at 253.
29. This list of factors to determine if a use is reasonable includes purpose,
suitability to the water body, economic value, social value, harm it causes, potential for coordinating with competing uses, temporal priority, and fairness of restricting a use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977).
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The Riparian Foundation of Pennsylvania Water Law

Riparian rights, as applied through the reasonable use theory, 30 are still dominant in Pennsylvania. The doctrine is firmly
rooted in Pennsylvania cases reaching back for over two centuries. 3 1 As a result, Pennsylvania uses an ancient doctrine to resolve some of the most sophisticated water law cases arising in the
state.
A recent example of the application of the riparian rights
doctrine to a modem water use controversy is illustrated by the
1988 case of Alburger v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.3 2 In this case, the
Philadelphia Electric Company used a secondary source river to
increase the flow of a non-navigable river. 33 By doing so, the flow
of the non-navigable river increased from 1.4 cubic feet per second (cfs) to over 71 cfs. 34 A lower riparian owner brought suit
against the electric company seeking to enjoin the discharge of
the additional water into the river. 3 5 The court granted an injunction preventing the electric company from increasing water
flow across the lower riparian owner's land. 3 6 Consequently, the
30. For a discussion of reasonable use theory, see supra notes 24-29 and
accompanying text.
31. For a general discussion on riparian rights, see supra notes 17-29 and
accompanying text. The following are examples of Pennsylvania cases discussing riparian rights. Most of the principles of Pennsylvania riparianism were developed over one hundred years ago.
In Brown v. Kistler, 42 A. 885 (Pa. 1899), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the owner of property through which a natural water course
flows has the right to make reasonable use of that water. In addition, persons
owning land down stream from other riparian owners have rights which entitle
them to the continued flow of the existing watercourse in the same channel and
in the same quality and quantity as the watercourse previously flowed. Fiedler v.
Coen, 505 A.2d 286 (Pa. Super. 1986).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Palmer v. Lehighton Water Supply
Co., 124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924), held that "[e]very riparian owner is entitled to use so
much of a stream running by or through his lands as may be necessary for domestic needs or other similar purposes. The use for extraordinary purposes
must be such as will not sensibly or materially diminish the quantity." Id. at 748.
32. 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1988).
33. Id. at 730. The court noted that there is a difference in riparian rights
cases when the stream is non-navigable rather than navigable. When the stream
is navigable, the state holds title to all land underneath the navigable waters.
When the stream is non-navigable, the owners of the land abutting the waterway
own the land underneath the water. Id. at 731 (citing Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Sugar Co., 36 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1944) and Ransberry v. Broadhead's Forest
& Stream Ass'n, 174 A. 97 (Pa. 1934)).
34. Id.
35. Id. In the alternative, the appellants sought to compel the electric company to condemn a right of way in the stream and pay them just compensation.
d.
36. Alburger, 535 A.2d 729. The court noted that under normal circum-
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court had to fit this complex fact pattern into the context of a
constrictive riparian rights analysis.
This problem is also illustrated in Fielder v. Coen.3 7 In this
1986 case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court used riparianism to
resolve a dispute between two landowners over a man-made watercourse running through both properties. 3 8 The upstream
owners cut off the flow of water to the lower property, defending
their action on the theory that no riparian rights attach to a manmade water body.3 9 In this case, the court extended riparian
rights to the owners of the lower property. The court found that
the length of time which the watercourse had existed (over eightysix years) vested riparian rights in the landowners. 40 Here the
court was forced to use creative analysis to justly decide a water
law issue that was unforseen when riparianism developed.
These cases are examples of how Pennsylvania courts have
attempted to adapt laws formulated in much simpler times to the
complex water issues of today. The law that determined water
rights in an era when the concerns for water were drinking and
bathing now determines the rights of users, such as thermoelectric power facilities and water companies, which withdraw mil41
lions of gallons of water per day.
C.

Statutes and Regulations

Although Pennsylvania is a riparian jurisdiction, it has enacted a handful of statutes 4 2 to fill in the gaps which have materistances, an upstream riparian owner has a flowage easement across a lower ripanan owner's property for the discharge of all water that naturally arises in the
watercourse. Id. at 732.

37. 505 A.2d 286 (Pa. Super. 1986).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In the recent cases of Alburger, 535 A.2d 729, and Fiedler, 505 A.2d 286,
the courts rely on the very old cases of Brown, 42 A. 885 (Pa. 1899) and Palmer,

124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924).
42. In addition to the statues which exist in Pennsylvania, Article I, section
27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states as follows:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I. § 27. The concept embodied in this constitutional provision is
known as the public trust doctrine. Linda J. Bozung, Recent Developments in State

Constitutional Law, in LITIGATION 1985, at 151 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 277, 1985). Simply put, natural resources within
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alized under riparianism in modern day water law. In addition,
federal laws affect water allocation and use in Pennsylvania.
1.

1939 Water Rights Act

Under the 1939 Water Rights Act, a public water supply
agency 43 must apply for a permit with DER in order to acquire

water or water rights. 44 The purpose of the Act is to provide a
the state are considered to be held in trust for present and future generations to
use. Similar provisions have been added to the constitutions of several other
states. States with a constitutional provision embodying the public trust doctrine include the following: California, CAL. CONST. art. X. § 2; North Carolina,
N.C. CONST. art. XIV. § 5; New Mexico, NEW MExiCO CONST. art. XX. § 21; and
Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. art. XLIX.
Although on its face, the provision would appear to provide a cause of action for concerned citizens, the Pennsylvania courts have construed this provision very narrowly. See, e.g., National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302
A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw.), aff'd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (holding that this provision would offer no legal rights without further legislation to support it - provision is not self-executing). But see Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa.
Commw. 1973). However, in states such as California and North Dakota, the
public trust doctrine has been interpreted broadly to provide citizens with a
cause of action when their natural water resources are being abused. See, e.g.,
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal.), cert. denied sub nom., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding that pubic trust doctrine imposes
duty of continuing supervision over taking of water allowed by state and use of
appropriated water); United Plainsmen Assoc. v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm's, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (holding that water rights are
subject to public trust doctrine and determining that public trust doctrine circumscribed state water commission's water allocation authority). Unless Pennsylvania adopts a similar approach, the constitutional provision will remain a
strong statement of policy, but a moot issue for litigation. However, Pennsylvania can follow this constitutional requirement by adopting a regulated allocation system which embodies the policies of the doctrine.
43. A public water supply agency means "any corporation or any municipal
or quasi municipal corporation, district, or authority, now exiting or hereafter
incorporated under the laws of... Pennsylvania... and vested with the power,
authority, right, or franchise to supply water to the public .....
32 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 631 (1967 & Supp. 1991).
44. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 631-41 (1967 & Supp. 1991). The power to grant
permits to such agencies was formerly vested in the Water and Power Resources
Board, but was transferred to the Department of Environmental Resources in
1971. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510-8 (1990). An application for a permit must be
submitted under the following circumstances:
An application for water allocation is required when a pubic water supply agency: 1) Does not have a current valid permit for an existing surface water source, including springs; 2) Plans to develop a surface water
source of supply, including springs; 3) Wants to increase its rate of
withdrawal from a surface water source above the rate permitted by a
currently valid water allocation permit; 4) Acquires from another public
water supply agency a water system that uses surface water sources, regardless of whether that public water supply agency has a valid water
allocation permit; 5) Acquires water supply from another public water
supply agency or person withdrawing water supply from a surface water
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5

4
safe and adequate water supply to the public.
Under the Act, DER has the power to grant permits to water
supply agencies if it finds that the following three criteria are
present: 1) there is no conflict between the water or water rights
sought and the rights held by another public water supply agency
which would interfere with that agency's reasonable present and
future needs; 2) the water or the water rights proposed to be acquired are reasonably necessary to the present proposed and future needs of the public water supply agency making the
application; 3) the taking of the water or the water rights will not
interfere with navigation, public safety, or cause substantial injury
to the commonwealth. 4 6 The Act deals exclusively with surface
47
water; it does not cover ground water.

2.

The Clean Streams Act

Pennsylvania promulgated the Clean Streams Act 48 in 1937

and since then it has undergone considerable change. Under the
Act,
[t]he discharge of sewage or industrial waste or any noxious and deleterious substances into the waters of this
commonwealth, which is or may become inimical and injurious to the public health, or to animal or aquatic life
or to the uses of such waters for domestic or industrial
consumption, or for recreation, is hereby declared not to
be a reasonable or natural use of such waters, to be
49
against public policy and to be a public nuisance.
This provision of the Clean Streams Act is a codification of the
applicable common law as it exists in Pennsylvania. 50 Under the
Act, any person or entity seeking to discharge waste into a water
51
body must obtain a permit from DER.
source; 6) Expands its service area beyond the service area approved in
its most recently issued water allocation permit.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT,
TION,

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING APPLICATION FOR WATER ALLOCA-

Dated May 2, 1990.

45. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 631 (1967 & Supp. 1991).
46. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 637 (1967).
47. See 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 631(e) (1967).
48. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1-751.20 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
49. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 691.3 (1977 & Supp. 1991).

50. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974) (stating that statute was codification of common law as it existed in Pennsylvania).
51.

See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 691.5 (1977).
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Pennsylvania courts have broadly interpreted the powers of
DER to enforce the Clean Streams Act. For example, in DER v.
Borough of Carlisle,52 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether, under the Act, DER had the power to issue a
ban on any sewer discharge into a borough's sewer system until
upgrading of the system took place. 53 This ban was issued without prior notice or hearing. 54 The court held that "the objective
of the Clean Streams Law is to prevent further pollution of Commonwealth waters as well as to restore polluted water to their
once clean state . . . ."55 Therefore, the court found that where
necessary, DER had the authority to issue orders to prohibit additional sewer connections. 56
Although this Act does not directly affect water allocation, it
does affect the quality and cost of the water supply.
3.

Dam Safety Encroachment Act

The Dam Safety Encroachment Act regulates dams, reservoirs, obstructions, and encroachments in the watercourses of
Pennsylvania. 5 7 Anyone wishing to construct or modify any of the
above, must apply to DER for a permit. Anyone failing to apply
for a permit before taking action or anyone who violates her permit can be subject to criminal penalties including fines up to
58
$5,000 and imprisonment up to one year.
Since this statute not only affects watercourses but also wetlands and swamps, the Act can also be enforced by the other state
agencies who have responsibility to maintain these areas of Pennsylvania. 59 As a result, although the Dam Safety Act does not directly affect water allocation and use, it does affect flow controls
52. 330 A.2d 293 (Pa. Commw. 1974).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.at 297.
56. Id.
57. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 693.2 (1967 & Supp. 1991). The term watercourse
includes "[a]ny channel of conveyance of surface water having a defined bed and
banks, whether natural or artificial, with perennial or intermittent flow." Id.
§ 693.3.

58. 32

PA. STAT. ANN.

§ 693.22 (1967 & Supp. 1991).

59. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. DER, 555 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1989) (holding
that Pennsylvania Game Commission had authority to enforce Dam Safety Encroachment Act by bringing action to compel DER to issue permit before water
obstruction created). The court in Pennsylvania Game Comm'n allowed the action
because the Commission and DER were sister agencies both with purpose of
protecting the environment.
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before dams and reservoirs. 60
4.

1923 Limited Power and Water Supply Act

The 1923 Limited Power and Water Supply Act 6 ' regulates
the diversion of water for use by power plants in Pennsylvania.
Under this Act, anyone building any power dam or changing a
stream flow to develop power "for the main purpose of storing,

cooling, diverting, and using.., water for steam raising or steam
condensation, or both, in the generation of electric energy for use
in public service," 6 2 must receive a permit from DER. 63 The Act
mainly applies to hydroelectric plants and to thermal-electric facilities on non-navigable waters. 6 4 Under the Act, permits cannot
be granted for periods in excess of fifty years. 6 5
5.

Federal Pollution Control Act

On the federal level, DER is responsible for enforcing the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 66 (Clean Water Act) and the
Safe Drinking Water Act 6 7 (SDWA). The Clean Water Act, the
federal equivalent to the Clean Streams Act, 68 regulates the discharge of waste in the waters of Pennsylvania. 6 9 The SDWA addresses the quality of drinking water by regulating contaminants
found in consumptive water systems. 70 In 1984, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency gave DER the authority to administer the SDWA. 7 1 The 1986 amendments to the SDWA regu60. See 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 693.4 (1991).
61. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 591-625 (1967).
62. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 594 (1967).
63. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 592 (1967). This requirement does not apply to
such activities occurring within navigable waterways falling within federal jurisdiction. Id.
64. WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 226. Prior to
1939, the Act also dealt with water supply facilities and their ability to divert
surface waters. This portion of the Act was superseded by the 1939 Water
Rights Act. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
65. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 592 (1967).
66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).

67. 35

PA. STAT. ANN. §

721.1-.17 (1977 & Supp. 1991).

68. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
69. The Clean Water Act calls for restrictions on the amount, rates, and
concentrations of waste discharged into watercourses. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). The
Act further provides that a person must obtain a permit before discharging any
waste into any water body. Id.
70. Nancy M. Norling, et al., Safer Water at a Higher Price - Anticipating the
Impact of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 122 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 11, 13 (1988) [hereinafter Norling].
71. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 721.1-.17 (1977 & Supp. 1991). See also, WATER
RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA,

supra note 20, at 115.
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late the presence of eighty-three different contaminants in
America's drinking water. 72 Implementation of these amendments in Pennsylvania has proven to be extremely challenging to
water suppliers due to the exceedingly high costs of compliance. 73 Although these acts are not direct regulations on the allocation of water, they directly affect the quality of water resources.
D.

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

Pennsylvania's Public Utility Commission (PUC) is "an independent, administrative, quasi-judicial agency vested with the
responsibility to supervise and regulate all the public utilities conducting business in the Commonwealth.1 7 4 Thus, the PUC has
authority over public water utilities 75 in the state.
Water utilities provide water to customers who often do not
have riparian rights themselves. 7 6 Approximately 13.5 percent of
the water utilities in Pennsylvania are considered public and fall
within the authority of the PUC. 7 7 As a result, these water utilities
are regulated by both the PUC and DER under the 1939 Water
Rights Act. 78 The PUC must grant a "certificate of convenience"
for a water utility to begin or alter operations. 79 If the PUC finds
that "the granting of such certificate is necessary or proper for the
service, accommodation, convenience or safety of the public"
then the PUC will issue a certificate. 8 0 Before issuing a certificate,
the PUC is authorized to conduct public hearings, investigations
and site inspections of the utility. 8 '
In addition to these powers, the PUC also has rate setting
72. Norling, supra note 70, at 12-13.
73. See Ahmed Kaloko, Economic Impact of the Safe Drinking Water Act, NAWC
WATER, Fall 1990 at 21. It is estimated that compliance could cost water supply
companies millions of dollars. Id.

74.

WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA,

supra note 20, at 141.

75. Water utilities are private companies having rights to take, divert, store
and distribute water to customers by means of owned facilities. D. GETCHES,
WATER LAw 407 (1984). The utilities take the form of corporations, partnerships and sole proprietorships. Id. Some are municipally owned. Id.
76. See id. at 405. In riparian states such as Pennsylvania, it is necessary to
pass special laws granting authority to water companies to provide water to nonriparian lands. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
77. WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 143-44. There
are 2,464 community drinking water systems in Pennsylvania. Three hundred
and thirty four of these systems fall within the PUC authority. Id.
78. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
79. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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authority over public utility services rendered by a municipal corporation or its agencies.8 2 Furthermore, no public utility can
change its rates without giving sixty days notice to the PUC.83
The PUC thereafter has the authority to hold hearings and conduct investigations regarding the proposed rate increase.8 4 If a
public water utility is not providing adequate service to its customers, the PUC may deny an application for rate increases.8 5 In
considering rate increases, the PUC balances the goal of providing customers with the lowest possible rates with the goal of enabling the water utility to maintain a financially operable
86
business.
E.

Inter-State Water Management

Under the authority of the United States Constitution, Pennsylvania has entered into water compacts with its neighboring
states. Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution authorizes the creation of compacts between neighboring states
over river basin areas.8 7 To enact a compact, the states must obtain approval from Congress.8 8 Under a compact, a commission
may be created consisting of members from all states involved in
the compact as well as an appointee from the federal
government.8 9
The Delaware River Basin Commission 9° and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission 9 1 hold a great deal of power in
allocating Pennsylvania's water resources. Since there is no centralized system in Pennsylvania, these two interstate agencies
have retained authority over Pennsylvania waters that most other
82. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§

1301.

83. Id. § 1308(a).
84. Id. § 1308(b).
85. WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 144.
86. Id. at 143.
87. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. See also Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 1990 Annual Report.
88. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
89. See Delaware River Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 815.101 (1967 &
Supp. 1991). The Delaware Commission is comprised of the following states:
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and New York. See also Susquehanna River
Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 820.1-.8. (1967 & Supp. 1991). The Susquehanna Commission is comprised of the following states: Maryland, New York
and Pennsylvania.
90. Delaware River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.101-.106

(1967 & Supp. 1991).
91. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 820.1-.8. See
also, infra note 160-65.
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state legislatures have vested in their centralized state water agencies. 9 2 These two river basins and their commissions cover about
93
one half of Pennsylvania.
The broad powers of both of these commissions are defined
in the compacts as follows: "[t]he Commission shall develop and
effectuate plans, policies and projects relating to the water resources of the basin. It shall adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water resources conservation and
management in the basin." 9 4 One of the functions of these commissions is to plan for and control water supply in the basin areas. 95 The commissions have authority to regulate the allocation
and use of water in emergency flood and drought situations. 9 6
Furthermore, the compacts specifically provide the commissions
with the power to regulate the use of water in the basins for domestic, municipal, agricultural and industrial purposes. 9 7
F.

Problems with Pennsylvania's Current Water
Allocation System

As illustrated by the preceding analysis, water law in Pennsylvania is reactionary: a scattered patchwork of statutes superimposed upon an antiquated common law foundation. Riparianism
was once the dominant water allocation method in the East.
However, because of the many problems associated with riparianism, several eastern states have either supplemented riparianism
with a permit system, 98 or replaced it with comprehensive regulation (regulated riparianism). 9 9
The number of problems with a riparian system are evidence
of Pennsylvania's need to adopt a regulated riparian system. One
of the riparianism's greatest faults is that it is now based upon
92. 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 368.
93. Id.
94. Delaware River Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 815.101 (1967 & Supp.
1991); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 (1967 &
Supp. 1991).
95. Susquehanna River Basin Commission, Comprehensive Plan for Management and Development of the Vater Resources of the Susquehanna River Basin, 30 (June,

1987).
96. Id.
97. See supra note 94.

98. For a discussion on permit systems, see infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
99. The term regulated riparianism was developed by Villanova Law Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna in Joseph Dellapenna, Owning Surface Water in the
Eastern United States, 6 PROC. E. MIN. L. FOUND. 1-1 at 1-33 to 1-34. For a discussion of regulated riparianism, see infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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reasonable use of water.' 0 0 What is reasonable depends upon
many factors which vary from case to case and are subject to constant change. Riparianism often produces uncertainty and even
confusion,' 0 ' whereas water rights should clearly define the relative rights of all users.' 0 2 As a result, the riparian system has be03
come inadequate.1
In addition, there are a number of other problems with
riparianism. It was developed at a time of low use, and assumes a
water surplus. Thus, it is only designed to resolve occasional disputes between individual water users.' °4 Furthermore, there is
no efficient mechanism for resolving disputes between competing
users. 10 5 Once the dispute gets to the courts, decisions are made
without the expertise and administrative continuity to assure a
predictable allocation system.' 0 6 Finally, riparianism does not
07
recognize the relationship between surface and ground water.
As a result of these problems, different states have developed
different systems to cope with their increasing needs.' 0 Considering the growing complexity of water issues in Pennsylvania and
the obsolescence of the law now in effect, a more efficient, centralized, modern approach must be developed.
III.
A.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF WATER ALLOCATION

Prior Appropriation

Prior appropriation is an alternative system of water allocation developed by some western states.' 0 9 There are two basic
100. For a discussion on the reasonable use theory, see supra notes 24-29
and accompanying text.
101. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 415. The confusion and uncertainty
acts as an impediment to resolving disputes arising from water shortages. Id.
"[O]ne cannot be certain who may use the available water or how much and for
what purpose.
Ausness, supra note 2, at 552.
102. Id.
103. For a general discussion of the inadequacy of common law water
rights, see Ausness, supra note 2, at 552-53.
104. GOLDFARB, supra note 18, at 24. The system does not establish comprehensive regulation and is not suitable in periods of chronic water shortages.
Id.
105. "Generally, [competing] water users must resort to litigation to resolve disputes." Ausness, supra note 2, at 553.
106. GOLDFARB, supra note 18, at 25. "Case-by-case judicial decision making
results in inconsistent and impermanent results." Id.
107. Ausness, supra note 2, at 553. However, this article will limit its discussion to surface water.
108. For a list of states which have adopted regulated riparianism to deal
with the increased demand, see supra note 145.
109. The prior appropriation method developed in the western United
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principles under prior appropriation. The first and most important principle is that water must be put to a publicly defined beneficial use and cannot extend beyond such use." 0 The second
principle is time. Priority of use is determined by first in time,
first in right."' The doctrine's allocation method provides clear
entitlement to water, allowing a user to perfect his rights against
2
another if the supply of water cannot accommodate both users. "
When the appropriative water right becomes vested," t1 the right
becomes a constitutionally protected property interest.' "4 Prior
appropriation thus provides protection for those who put water to
a beneficial use against interference by a later appropriator.' 15
Prior appropriation can only develop where there is no present water allocation method. 1 6 In California, appropriative law
developed before an effective government was established." 1 7 In
the East, there is not only a current effective formal government,
States to meet the special needs of water users in dry climates. Water management in the West differs from water management in the East. D. Craig Bell &
Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses: The History of Conflict,
the Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. LAw 1, 4 (1991) [hereinafter Bell].
Where water is abundant, law and policy are aimed at navigation and protection
against floods. Id. Where water is scarce, laws and policy are aimed at offstream
water needs. Id. Prior appropriation first evolved in California to allocate water
among gold miners, and soon extended throughout the West. A. Dan Tarlock,
Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
979, 983 (1991) [hereinafter Tarlock]. Some commentators draw a parallel between prior appropriation and John Locke's The Second Treatise of Government. See
generally ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 15. Locke describes how scarce resources
should be distributed in a State of Nature according to the principles of priority
of right and beneficial use. Id. Similarly, prior appropriation provides that the
first person to apply water to a beneficial use is first in right against later appropriators. Heather B. Lee, Forcing the FederalHand. Reserved Water Rights v. States'
Rights for Instream Protection, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1271, 1272 (1990) [hereinafter
Lee].
110. Bell, supra note 109, at 5. "Although the definition of beneficial use
changed over time, the necessity of using water beneficially has remained constant." Id.
111. Id. "The doctrine thus protects those who put water to beneficial use
against impairment of their use by subsequent appropriators." Id.
112. Tarlock, supra note 109, at 982. Initially, prior appropriation granted
water rights to individual holders in what was a "pure property" system. Bell,
supra note 109, at 4. As the doctrine evolved, public rights have received more
attention. Id.
113. The water right becomes vested when water is applied to a beneficial
use. See generally Lee, supra note 109.
114. Id. at 5. This property interest can be sold, leased or otherwise alienated. Id.
115. Id.
116. Joseph W. Dellapenna, RiparianRights in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 51,
62 (1990) [hereinafter Riparian Rights].
117. Id. In California a government had not been established to survey and
grant title to land. Id. at 56. The gold miners were unwilling to wait for the
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but also a current water allocation system: riparianism. Because
prior appropriation has to be the first system in place, before any
claim or rights are established to land, it cannot be imported to
the East where there is an existing government and a water allocation mechanism.
B.

Dual or Hybrid Systems

A dual or hybrid system is a combination of riparianism and
prior appropriation."18 Most dual or hybrid states' 19 treat appropriative water law as the primary system for determining water
20
rights and riparianism as a deviation from that primary right.'
Under the dual system, water rights for non-riparian land may be
established by appropriation if the water supply is sufficient. 12 '
Because riparian rights all have the same priority dates,' 22 the
only basis for litigating disputes is to determine riparian reason23
able use.'
The practical results from riparianism vary greatly between
dual system states.' 24 This is because some dual states have
stressed different aspects of the two systems, depending upon
government process, and simply sought gold as trespassers and took what water
they needed. Id.
118. Riparian Rights, supra note 116, at 62.
119. For the west coast and some central states which are not high elevation
arid land or low elevation land with substantial rainfall, neither the riparian nor
the prior appropriation method of water allocation was feasible. Most of these
states had at one time followed riparianism, but because of increasing settlers
and water scarcity, riparianism no longer could resolve disputes adequately. See
generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 345-50. Just as the riparian natural flow
theory developed into the reasonable use theory to accommodate increased demand, so did reasonable use theory have to be retooled into a new system for
some of these drier states in the West. For a discussion of early riparian theory,
see supra note 24. "Reshaping was necessary because the received concepts
were unable to cope with the demands that new water uses put on the available
supply."

DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 346.

120. Riparian Rights, supra note 116, at 62. Resolving water use disputes
when one use is based on appropriation law and another inconsistent use is
based on riparian law poses an "extraordinarily difficult problem." Id. at 61.
The priority date is "the cutoff date which marks the formal transition from a
primarily riparian system to a primarily appropriative system." Id. at 62.
121. Id.
122. Only prior appropriation rights use time as a basis for determining
priority of use. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
123. Riparian Rights, supra note 116, at 62.
124. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 349. "Riparian rights continue to have
considerable importance in California, Texas, and Washington ... although in
states like Oregon, . . . the riparian rights could be described as vestigial at
best." Id.
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their particular needs and uses. 12 5 The contrasting aspects of
dual system states include theories about the relation of federal
and state legal doctrine in water consumption, theories about the
parameters of riparian rights, and theories about organizing riparian and appropriative rights in the same legal system.' 26
Field experts believe that the dual system approach is not
likely to be useful in the East.' 2 7 This is because riparian rights
developed differently under the western dual system than under
the eastern riparian system. 12 8 Riparian rights under the dual system are primarily based on appropriative law, whereas riparian
rights in the East are based solely on riparianism. Applying a dual
system to the East is similar to, and as unworkable as, applying
29
prior appropriation to the East.'
C.

Regulated Systems
1. Permit Approach

States which use a permit system to allocate water, enact statutory schemes designed to promote efficient distribution of
water.' 3 0 Some states require permits for new riparian uses as
well as for existing uses.' 3 ' Failure to obtain a permit for an existing use can result in a loss of the right to begin using riparian
rights at any time in the future.' 32 Under the permit approach, 33
125. The characteristics of dual systems do not coordinate fully between
these states. These dual systems are characterized "by several particular aspects
of the legal doctrine followed in each state." Id. at 350.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 411-12.
128. Id. The needs in the West and the East are so diverse, and the states'
concepts of riparian rights are so different that precedent from one area must be
used very cautiously as a guide for decisions in the other area. Id.
129. For a discussion of the problems of using prior appropriation in the
East, see supra note 116-17 and accompanying text.
130. GETCHES, supra note 75, at 75.
131. Id. at 76.
132. Id.
133. As the population of the United States grew and moved West and
outside the reach of eastern rivers, many riparian states enacted statutes
designed to promote a more efficient allocation of water. As the riparian water
law system became inadequate, many eastern states supplemented or replaced
common law rules with some type of statutory system. Ausness, supra note 2, at
547. State legislatures responded to droughts early by enacting statutes which
required permits for particular kinds of uses. During the nineteenth century,
various statutory preferences were introduced into riparian states. DELLAPENNA,
supra note 17, at 422. It is generally agreed that the first statutory regulation of
riparianism began with the Mill Acts. See id at 418. The Mill Acts began in
colonial times, giving mill owners special water rights, when often the only
source of power for industry was water power. Id. A problem which mill owners
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certain users must obtain permits to use water from the state
DER. Statutory regulation began as preferences 3 4 which benefitted the public.13 5 Since then they have extended from small scale
uses of water to some large scale water impoundments, such as
36
hydroelectric and other dams.'
Courts and legislatures faced the same problems with the advent of flood-control, irrigation, and hydroelectric dams, as they
37
had faced two hundred years earlier when mills first appeared.
What should be done to accommodate uses which benefit the
public? Legislatures responded by enacting statutes designed to
allow dams to interrupt consumptive and non-consumptive water
uses, and also to provide a floor level of protection for public and
other water interests.' 3 8 All states have some permit statutes
dealing with at least public water regulation.' 3 9 In addition, fed140
eral law requires that all states regulate water quality.
Riparianism no longer covered state needs because of its associated problems. 14 1 Neither prior appropriation 42 nor the
dual system could be applied to the eastern states.' 43 For these
reasons, all eastern riparian states developed some sort of permit
44
system as their primary water allocation method.
faced was backflooding behind the mill reservoir. Without the mill acts, neighboring owners could enjoin the backflooding and cause the closing of the mill.
Id. at 419. With the mill acts, towns competed to attract millwrights by granting
mill sites on which to establish facilities. Id.
134. Most of the statutory preferences were mainly for agriculture. Id. at
422. Some state statutes also give broad preferences for agricultural uses ....
"Missouri, for example, flatly exempts all agricultural dams from its regulatory
scheme." DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 422. Some statutes give very narrow

preferences for agriculture. Id. Other statutes give agricultural preferences only
based upon certain criteria. Id. "Tennessee's statute exempts farm dams from
regulation if the dam is not more than six feet in height regardless of storage
capacity, or with a storage capacity of not more than 15 acre-feet regardless of
height." Id.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 418.
137. Id. The problem was trying to accommodate uses that benefitted the
public while still respecting individual riparian rights. The legislature responded by interpreting the mill acts as applying to larger and industrial dams
as an early response to these problems. Id.
138.

DELLAPENNA,

supra note 17, at 247.

139. Id. at 217. Indeed, no state solely relies on pure riparian rights. Id.
140. Id.
141. For a discussion of the problems with riparianism, see supra notes 10007 and accompanying text.
142. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 417.
143. For a brief discussion of why the dual system could not work in the
East, see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
144. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 445.
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Comprehensive Regulation

Comprehensive regulatory statutes attempt to allocate water
in the most efficient way, and to cover all potential disputes over
water rights in order to minimize litigation and clarify the boundaries of water rights. Comprehensive regulation (regulated
riparianism)14 5 is a complete regulatory permit system based on
riparian principles as the primary water allocation method to divert water from some or all sources. 14 6 All direct users of water
must obtain a permit from a state administrative agency in order
to use the water. 14 7 Typically the comprehensive riparian statutes
regulate for the purpose of: 1) conserving water and other resources; 2) promoting the beneficial and/or efficient use of water;
3) assuring water use is consistent with public interest; 4) establishing comprehensive state planning; 5) protecting public water
supplies; 6) preserving minimum stream flows; and 7) regulating
interstate or interbasin diversions.' 48 Although there are some
similar provisions in many state water statutes, each state's regu14 9
lated riparian statute is unique in some sense.
Even with permits covering all or most of water's uses, there
remain problems with comprehensive regulation. Generally,
145. By 1990, over half of the eastern riparian states had adopted some
type of comprehensive regulated riparianism statutes. Id. Seventeen of thirtyone states east of Kansas City had adopted such statutes. Id. The statutes of the
seventeen states with comprehensive regulation are: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22201 to 622 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-365 to 378 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-31 (1991); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 373.012-.619 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-520 to 31, 12-5-43 to 53 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-11 to 9, 13-2-6.1-1 to .1-9, 13-2-2.6-1 to 17 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261-.281 (West 1190 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 151.010-.600 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1990); ANN. CODE MD. §§ 8-101 to 204,
8-801 to 814 (Michie 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (West
1981 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37-.55 (West 1987); Miss CODE
ANN. §§ 51-1-5 to 3-53 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-1 to 17 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1991); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 15-1501 to 1528 (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11 to 143-215.22 (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to 253 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1991);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.18, 30.28, 30.292, 30.294, 30.298, 144.026 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
146. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 417. So far there has been little litigation under the new statutes, either because the systems are working well or because the systems are too new. Id. at 417-18.
147. Id. at 448. The permit systems differ from regulated riparianism in
that the permit systems are not complete and leave some water consumers to
resolve disputes under riparianism. Id.
148. Id. at 446-47.
149. Id. But see FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., A MODEL WATER CODE (1972)
[hereinafter MALONEY].
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there are two types of problems with regulated riparianism: the
protection of private values' 50 and the furtherance of public
values. 15'
Pennsylvania is an example of a state, without a regulated
water system, which relies strongly on riparianism. Pennsylvania
currently faces the question of whether it should hold on to its
riparian system with all of its inadequacies or, like a majority of
other eastern states, adopt a comprehensive regulation system
which will accommodate its modern needs and provide protection
in case of drought. This article recommends and urges the adoption of a comprehensive regulated water allocation system in
Pennsylvania to resolve the problems associated with riparianism.
IV.

THE ADOPTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE WATER
REGULATION STATUTE

A.

The Problem in Pennsylvania

One of the greatest impediments to developing a more efficient water allocation system in Pennsylvania, ironically, is the
abundant supply of water. 152 Because the availability of water is
rarely an issue, Pennsylvania, like most eastern states, has not
made water planning a priority.' 53 Thus, comprehensive water
resource management has only been considered in an emergency
context. However, Pennsylvania needs such proactive management of water resources for reasons independent of emergency
150. DELLAPENNA, supra note 17, at 448. The system may not provide adequate security of investment in the face of such a high degree of administrative
discretion. Id.
151. Id. The issue is whether the new system would be able to create effective comprehensive planning mechanisms, define and protect minimum stream
flows, manage and direct public uses, and respond to serious water shortages.
Id.
152. It has long been recognized that the impetus for comprehensive
change in water law required a more desperate water situation. See, e.g., Timothy
Weston & Michael W. Gang, Law of Groundwaterin Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV.
11 (1976). Weston and Gang, in their 1976 law review article, concluded "[i]t is
a familiar expression that 'you never miss the water till the well runs dry.' The
expression applies to today's water laws and institutions. The public will not
miss a rational, comprehensive water law until it needs that law to resolve conflicts in water use." Id. at 62. The fact that this quote is just as timely today,
sixteen years later, is additional evidence that the impetus for change in water
law requires dire circumstances.
153. Water users in eastern states have thought of water as a free resource.
Peter N. Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents For Missouri, 47
Mo. L. REV. 429, 430 (1982). Historically, the only limitations on the water supply have been the physical availability of water and common law doctrines which
restrict use to fair share. Id.
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situations. 154

How Pennsylvania should comprehensively regulate the use
of water is a complex question. 5 5 In the narrowest sense the issues appear relatively simple: who gets to use water, under what
conditions may the water be used, and who will make the decisions about the use of water. However, the concerned legislator,
regulator, water user, conservationalist and citizen may view these
issues differently reflecting each of these group's varying agenda.
The adoption of a comprehensive statute involves many concerns. First, any consideration of comprehensive state legislation
in Pennsylvania evokes traditional concerns about a centralized
regulatory authority.1 56 Second, an economic evaluation of a regulated water system focuses on the efficient allocation of a critical
resource. Although water is not "scarce" in traditional economic
terms, it is no longer viewed as a "free" resource. 5 7 Finally, the
adoption of a regulated statute involves a power struggle for control between competing interests, representing agriculture, water
companies, domestic and commercial water users, thermoelectric
15 8
power users, industry, conservationalists and DER.
154. For a discussion of the problems arising under the current riparian
system in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
155. The complexity of the issues surrounding water regulation is evidenced by the diversity of testimony at the hearings held across the state on the
subject of water management. Water Resources Management: Hearings Before the Joint
Legislative Air and Water Pollution Control and Conservation Committee, Pennsylvania
General Assembly, (Sept. 12, 13, 19, and 27, 1991) [hereinafter Water Resources
Management: Hearings (Sept. 12, 1991); Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept.
13, 1991); Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept. 19, 1991); Water Resources
Management: Hearings (Sept. 27, 1991)]. The state held hearings, in September
1991, on four separate dates and in four different locations throughout Pennsylvania to give various interest groups the opportunity to have input regarding
state water regulation.
156. For a discussion of problems with centralized management, see infra
notes 207-12 and accompanying text. In recent decades Pennsylvania has
adopted several comprehensive administrative regulations in other water related
areas. See The Clean Stream Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1-.1001 (1977 & Supp.
1991); The Dam Safety and EncroachmentsAct, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § § 693.1-.27 (1967
& Supp. 1991); The Flood Plain Management Act,. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 679.101.601 (1967 & Supp. 1991). For a discussion of the Clean Streams Act and the
Dam Safety and Encroachments Act see supra notes 48-60. Part of the impetus
for the enactment of these statutes was federal requirements and incentives. 6
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 363.
157. For a discussion of the eastern states tendency to view water as a free
resource, see Davis, supra note 153, at 430-31. See also MALONEY, supra note 149
at 70 (noting that increased industrialization and urbanization combine to put
more strain on supplies of water, particularly in the East).
158. The magnitude of interest from each of these groups in Pennsylvania
is partially reflected in the four hearings which were held across the state in
September, 1991. See generally, Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept. 12,
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It is important to recognize that Pennsylvania's role in protecting the general welfare of the state overshadows these admin59
istrative, economic and political interstate conflicts.1
Pennsylvania's general welfare would be better protected with
comprehensive water regulation with a centralized state regulatory board. Without such a board, authorized by comprehensive
regulation, Pennsylvania would have no agency to implement the
regulations of the River Basin Commissions. 60 In the absence of
such a state regulatory board, the Commissions, rather than the
state, oversee the implementation of compact regulations in
Pennsylvania.' 6 ' The impact of this regulatory void in Penn1991) (Sept. 13, 1991) (Sept. 19, 1991) (Sept. 27, 1991), supra note 155. Some
interest groups, such as agriculture, were represented in much greater proportion than others, such as the business community. Id. However, business and
industry will prepare their own position paper on potential water regulation
through the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry. Telephone Interview with Susan Yenchko, Director Environmental Resources, Pennsylvania
Chamber of Business and Industry (Feb. 7, 1992).
159. Regulation of water use is primarily a state function. See MALONEY,
supra note 149, at 72 (citing Smith, Total Management of Water Resources, 59J. AM.
WATER WORKS Ass'N 1335, 1337 (1967)). For a further discussion of the state's
power to legislate water use in relation to federal law, see BECK, supra note 2, at
67-68. The state's primary role in water regulation is recognized in the authorizing section to many comprehensive water regulatory systems. See, e.g., MALONEY,
supra note 149, at 81 ("Recognizing that the waters of the state are the property
of the state and are held in public trust for the benefit of its citizens, it is declared that the people of the state as beneficiaries of this trust have a right to
have the waters protected for their use."). For the authorizing rationale for
comprehensive water regulation of another Delaware River Basin state, see 7
DEL. CODE ANN., § 1601 (the land, water and air resources of the state must be
protected, conserved and controlled to assure their reasonable and beneficial
use in the interest of the people of the state).
160. The River Basin Commissions fill the legislative void in Pennsylvania
through their permitting authority. For a discussion of the void that these Commissions fill, see 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 304 (citing 32 PA.

STAT. ANN. §§ 815.101-.106 (1967 & Supp 1991) & 820.1-.8 (1967 & Supp.
1991)) (Affirmative authority, respectively, for Delaware River Basin Commission and Susquehanna River Basin Commission).
161. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1, Art. 1.3(6) (1967 & Supp. 1991) The Susquehanna River Basin Compact provides in pertinent part:
It is the express intent of the signatory parties that the commission
shall engage in the construction, operation, and maintenance of a project only when the project is necessary to the execution of the comprehensive plan and no other competent agency is in a position to act, or such
agency fails to act.
Id. (emphasis added). In the absence of statutory authority designating an
agency to handle these issues in Pennsylvania, it appears that Pennsylvania abdicates some control over its water resources where other states do not. The authority for states to regulate in water use is provided in the compact as follows:
Each state and local agency otherwise authorized by law to plan, design,
construct, operate, or maintain any project or facility in or for the basin
shall continue to have, exercise and discharge such authority, except as
specifically provided by this section.
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sylvania is magnified by the fact that all other river basin States 16 2
have comprehensive statutes regulating water. 163 The River Basin Commissions often administer regulations in the absence of
state legislation.' 64 Consequently, because it lacks a regulatory
board, Pennsylvania is the only river basin state which does not
participate in the administration of Basin regulations within its
65
state.1
The Pennsylvania State Legislature is considering enacting a
comprehensive water regulation bill prepared by DER.' 66 Pennsylvania could model its comprehensive regulation after the regulations which seventeen other states have adopted. 67 These
Id. In addition, the Susquehanna compact provides affirmative authority for the
Commission to delegate tasks involving implementation to the states as follows:
... the commission may: ... [eImploy any other agency or instrumentality of
any of the signatory parties or of any political subdivision thereof, in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of structures, and the
installation and management of river control systems, or for any other
purpose.
Id. Art. 3.7(2) (emphasis added). This provision would seem to enable the Commission to delegate many management procedures to Pennsylvania if Pennsylvania had the proper authority to receive the delegation.
162. For a list of the other states which compose the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts, see supra note 89. For an analysis of the River
Basin Commissions, see supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
163. DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 6001-31 (1991), CODE Mo. ANN. §§ 8-101 to 8204, 8-801 to 8-814 (Michie 1987), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-1 to 58:1A-17
(West 1982 Supp.), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 15-1501 to 15-1528 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992). 6JOSEPH DELLAPENNA, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 364
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). See, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 160-600 (Delaware
water legislation).
164. Delaware River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.101 815.106 (1967 & Supp. 1991). Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 820.1-.8 (1967 & Supp. 1991).
165. In fact, one of Pennsylvania's responsibilities as a member of the Commissions is to seek enactment of legislation within the state that will help effectuate the implementation of Basin regulations.
Each of the signatory parties [Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, and
the United States Government] agrees that it will seek enactment of such
additional legislation as will be required to enable its officers, departments, commissions, boards, and agents to accomplish effectively the obligations and duties assumed under the terms of this compact.
32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 (1967 & Supp. 1991). This provision would seem to
provide Pennsylvania with a duty to enact comprehensive water regulation if it
would help administer the provisions of the Basin Compacts.
166. Telephone Interview with Tom Fidler, DER (Jan. 1992). DER is currently preparing a proposal for review by the legislature. Id. A preview of their

proposals was issued in September of 1991.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EN-

VIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, PROTECTING WATER USES
SYLVANIA (Sept. 1991) [DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES].

IN PENN-

167. For a list of the comprehensive water regulation statutes in other
states, see supra note 145.
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statutes vary significantly in their scope and content.16

The con-

tent of proposed legislation and its impact on various interest
groups will determine whether this essential legislation is
adopted.'

69

168. Water regulations statutes in the East differ from each other in a variety of ways including purpose, water subject to permit requirements, activities
subject to permit requirements and allocation of water. See generally, Davis, supra
note 153, at 446-50.
There are a variety of purposes for water regulation statutes in the East. Id.
at 446-47. "The purposes include allocating water among competing users,
promoting beneficial and efficient uses of water, assuring the best use of water in
the public interest, dealing with water shortages, protecting public water supplies, protecting minimum streamflows, promoting flood control, promoting
water conservation, and establishing state comprehensive water planning." Id.
at 446-47. See generally Ausness, supra note 2, at 556-75.
Three types of water are potentially subject to regulation: surface water,
ground water, and diffused surface water. Davis, supra note 153 at 447. Most
eastern states regulate surface water and groundwater. Id. Some of these states
have separate legislation for ground and surface water. See, e.g., Ausness, supra
note 2, at 562 (Georgia and Indiana are examples of states which have separate
legislation addressing surface water and ground water).
Statutes may regulate diverting the flow of water or withdrawing water.
Statutes which regulate diversions "may regulate diversions from surface watercourses, impoundments on surface watercourses, and wells and diversions from
groundwater." Davis, supra note 153, at 448. A variety of exemptions are sometimes made for domestic purposes, agricultural diversions, public water supplies
or other small diversions or impoundments. Id. at 448-49.
Allocation of water among competing users is given different emphasis in
states based upon the purpose of a statute. Id. at 450. The statutes which emphasize the efficient allocation of water usually provide for a priority allocation
system. Id. A priority water allocation system allocates water based upon specific factors. Davis, supra note 153, at 451-52 (citing the factors used by Georgia
and North Carolina). One of the most referenced statutes is the Model Water
Code which has been adopted by Florida. See MALONEY, supra note 149. The
Code is a useful model of a comprehensive water statute. It integrates all direct
aspects of management of water resources into one body of law under one governmental agency. Trealease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the
Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RES.J. 207 (1974). The Model Water Code is considered a viable option for the eastern states which contemplate the substitution of
a comprehensive water regulatory program for the law of riparianism. Id. at
212.
169. Telephone Interview with Tom Fidler, supra note 166. In the past,
state senators have routinely proposed alternative legislation for comprehensive
water management. S. 1054, 1991 Session; S. 837, 1989 Session; S. 476, 1987
Session; S. 1525, 1986 Session. The Senate proposals are identically described
as "[an Act ... providing for water resources planning and emergency management; creating the State Water Resources Board and regional water resources
boards and giving them powers and duties; providing penalties; and making an
appropriation." See, e.g., S. 1054, 1991 Session, at 1.
The primary difference between the Senate Bills and the proposal by the
DER is the decentralization of control of water management to regional boards.
Id. at 16-17. The provision calls for the establishment of six separate water resources boards in the following regions: Delaware River Basin, Upper Susquehanna River Basin, Lower Susquehanna River Basin, Ohio River Basin, Lake
Erie and Genesee River Basin, and Potomac River Basin. Id.
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The Proposed Legislation in Pennsylvania

In September 1991, DER submitted a preliminary Comprehensive Water Management recommendation to the Pennsylvania
legislature. 70 According to DER, "[t]he Commonwealth needs
its water in the right place at the right time for economic productivity, human health, public safety, recreation and aquatic
habitat."' 7 1 The proposal recognizes that while water is usually
not a scarce resource in Pennsylvania,1 72 it is not always allocated
73
efficiently among competing users in times of scarcity.'
DER's proposed regulations can be separated into three cate170. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166. The provisions reflect recommendations by DER for comprehensive regulation of water.
The proposal is a precursor to the formulation of an actual proposal to be
presented to the State Legislature.
171. Id. Similarly, the Joint Legislative Air and Water Pollution Control
and Conservation Committee noted in its report that the goal of water resources
management is the "maximization of water quantity and quality in the right
place and right time, and at a reasonable cost in response to conflicting demands
for water." PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY JOINT LEGISLATIVE AIR AND
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AND CONSERVATION COMMITrTEE, REPORT ON WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 1991 Sess. 3 (1992) (citations ommitted) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY].

172. It appears that Pennsylvania has more than enough water. Id. at 2.
"There is an average of 42 inches of rainfall in the state; about 65,000 miles of
rivers and streams; more than 2,500 lakes and resevoirs; and trillions of gallons
of groundwater." Id. See also, Kim L. Wetzel, et. al., Pennsylvania Water Supply and
Use, in NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1987, 433, 434.
173. The Joint Legislative Air and Water Pollution Control and Conservation Committee noted that "while water is available in all parts of the state, adequate and accessible water supplies for all users may not always be available in
sufficient quantities to meet local demand, especially during drought or emergencies." PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 171, at 2.
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gories: management, 174 administration, 75 and planning.
following is a summary of these provisions.

76

The

174. The provisions providing for management authority can be separated
into two groups. The first group are those providing affirmative authority to
DER and related state agencies to regulate water in Pennsylvania. The second
group provide DER with blanket authority in specific situations.
The recommended management provisions in the first group providing affirmative authority to DER are the following:
[] Designates DER as the administering agency for planning, permitting, and emergency response and Environmental Quality Board as
the decision making body for rules, regulations, and plan updates
and revisions.
Provides for the establishment of a State-level Water Resources
Policy Advisory Council and for the establishment of regional advisory bodies.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166, at paras. 1 & 2.
The recommended management provisions in the second group which
would grant DER blanket authority in specific situations are as follows:
[] Provides DER with the authority to implement special management
measures within areas where demand is approaching water supply
available ([s]pecial [sic] management areas).

[] Expands the emergency response authority of the Department to
undertake management actions, in consultation with PEMA, necessary to implement the State Water Resources Emergency Plan.
Id. at paras. 9 & 11.
175. The proposals relating to administration include registration, permitting, reporting and fees regulations as follows:
[
Requires the Registration and Reporting to DER of all withdrawals
that average more than 10,000 gpd.
Requires the permitting by DER of all public supply withdrawals
from ground and surface water sources statewide.
[ Requires the permitting by DER of all withdrawals/diversions in
excess of 100,000 gpd from ground and surface sources statewide.
[ Requires the permitting by DER of all withdrawals/diversions
which exceed 10,000 gpd within special management areas.
[

Provides for the collection of fees and establishes fines and penalties
for non-compliance.

[

Provides for incentives for reducing water usage through conservation
credits.
Id. at paras. 6-8, 10, 12 and 13 respectively.
176. The provisions of DER's proposal relating to planning are as follows:
[ Recognizes the existing State Water Plan and requires review by
the Department every five years.
Requires the preparation of a State Water Resources Emergency
Plan by the Department to include ....

Requires the development and submission of emergency contingency plans by all public water suppliers, those entities subject to
regulation in special management areas, and other users withdrawing in excess of 100,000 gpd, for approval by DER.
Id. at paras. 3-5 respectively.
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1. Management
The management provisions in DER's proposal provide affirmative authority for the creation of a centralized water regulatory body and related agencies.' 77 Furthermore, the provisions
enumerate the powers to be vested in these governmental bodies.17 8 These management provisions can be separated into two
groups: those that provide specific powers to DER and affiliated
agencies, and those which provide DER with unchecked, broad
79
powers. 1
The first group of provisions primarily designates DER as the
administering agency for planning, permitting and responding to
emergencies. 8 0 In addition, the provisions allow for several subsidiary agencies in the Environmental Quality Board, a state-level
Water Resources Policy Advisory Council, and regional advisory
bodies.' 8 1 Thus, these provisions identify the regulating agencies. Since they do not directly affect the rights of any users, this
group of provisions is unlikely to receive opposition.
The second group of management provisions, providing for
broad powers, however, is likely to receive opposition. The provisions grant DER the authority to implement special management measures when the water supply is threatened and the
82
authority to implement the Water Resources Emergency Plan.'
Few interest groups will object to ensuring efficient water
management in times of emergency. However, interest groups
will object to such management authority without defined limits.
For example, the proposed provisions refer to implementing special management procedures in times of emergency without
177. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166.
178. Id.
179. Most water withdrawers, including utilities, individuals, and businesses object to blanket powers for two reasons. Interview with Robert E. Johnstone, Vice President of Operations, Joe Dysard, Vice President of the Central
District, and Frank Hildabrand, District Engineer, Central District, General Waterworks Management and Service Company [Hereinafter General Waterworks]
(Feb. 1992). The proposed regulation's lack of specificity creates unpredictability. Id. The water withdrawer does not know when the administrator will step
in. The decision is left to the discretion of the regulator. See Trealease, supra
note 168, at 207. This defeats one of the primary purposes of enacting comprehensive regulation in place of common law, increased predictability. For a discussion of problems with riparianism, see supra notes 100-07. It is a
contradiction to enact legislation in order to increase predictability in the law
and then word the legislation so that it is vague.
180. For text of the management provisions, see supra note 174.
181. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166.
182. For full text of the regulations, see supra note 174-76.
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describing those procedures. As such, these procedures appear
to provide no check on DER's authority. I8 3 This nearly limitless
power means that groups will have no way to predict how DER
will react, especially in an emergency situation. Interest groups
will object to this unpredictability. Consequently, the limits of
DER's power in times of emergency should be identified in order
to ensure that the whole legislative package is not rejected simply
due to the lack of specificity of a few provisions.
2. Administration
The administrative provisions relate to permitting, registration, conservation credits, and fees for ground and surface water
withdrawals. 8 4 While imposing significant additional burdens on
a number of Pennsylvanians in comparison to current law, the
provisions are not unduly burdensome in comparison to regulated riparian statutes in other eastern states.' 8 5 For example,
many comprehensive water use statutes require permits for all
withdrawals or diversions of water.' 8 6 DER's proposal would
only require a permit for water withdrawals and diversions that
averaged more than 100,000 gallons per day (gpd) from ground
and surface sources. 18 7 This would enable most individual water
users and even some businesses and water utilities to avoid the
permit requirement.
The administrative proposals require users to register and
report to DER all withdrawals from ground and surface water
sources statewide.' 8 8 This would enable DER to identify and
183. The proposed regulations do not specify what "management actions"
can be taken in emergency situations. See supra note 174 for a discussion of the
reasons objections will be raised to these vague powers.
184. For a discussion of the content of the proposed administration provi-

sions, see supra note 175.
185. For a model regulated riparian statute, see MALONEY, supra note 149
and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., MALONEY supra note 149, at § 2.01.
187. For the text of the proposal concerning permitting withdrawal/diversions of water, see supra note 174. DER adds a caveat provision to
the gpd permitting limit by providing for permitting within "Special Management areas" of all withdrawals/diversions which exceed 10,000 gpd. Id. DER is
vague about what qualifies as a "special management area" stating only that they
are "areas where demand is approaching water supply available .... " Id. This
provision is likely to meet with resistance by various interest groups until the
term is more clearly defined and its impact can be assessed.
188. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166. For the
text of DER proposals relating to registration and reporting requirements, see
supra note 175.
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evaluate water use in Pennsylvania.' 8 9 Because there would not
be a gpd limit on registration requirements, this provision will
affect virtually all users who withdraw water including individuals,
water utilities, businesses, and farmers.
The administrative provisions also provide affirmative authority for the collection of fees, fines, and penalties for noncompliance.' 90 The amount and nature of the fees has not yet been
specified by DER. A one time application fee may be negligible
for most users.' 9 ' However, if DER's goal is to use the fees as a
means to fund the administration of the legislation, then it likely
will recommend fees based on use. This would result in higher
fees and resistance to the legislation from many interest groups.
The conservation credit provision is designed to stimulate
water preservation. 9 2 The provision would enable water users
who are frugal in their use to save money. However, the credit
provision will indirectly affect water utilities in terms of decreased
93
revenues.
3.

Planning

The planning provisions of DER's proposed regulation outline specific requirements for both DER and specified withdrawers. These specified withdrawers include public water
utilities, large withdrawers, and withdrawers in special management areas.' 94 Under the planning provisions, DER is required to
review the state water plan every five years.' 9 5 Moreover, DER is
required to prepare an emergency water plan that meets the spec-

ifications established in the legislation.' 96 The planning requirements for specified water users require them to file an emergency
19 7
contingency plan with DER.
189. The purpose of planning provisions is to enable DER to update the
State Water Plan. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note
166. For an analysis of the planning provisions, see infra 193-97 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 175 for the text of the proposal relating to fees.
191. Obviously, if it is a flat fee for all permit requests this weighs relatively
more heavily upon the small user who proportionally pays a higher fee.
192. For text of the proposed conservation provisions, see supra note 175.
193. For a discussion on why a decrease in water sales will not necessarily
lead to a decrease in profits, see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
194. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 176 at paras. 3-5 respectively. For text of the planning provisions, see id.

195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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Few groups will object to additional responsibilities being
placed upon DER. However, many of the specified withdrawers
who are forced to submit emergency contingency plans to DER,
may object to the additional work. The specified water withdrawers who would be required to submit these plans are public
water suppliers, entities subject to regulation in special management areas, and other users withdrawing in excess of 100,000
8
gpd. 19
C.

Impact on Pennsylvania

How comprehensive water use legislation will effect the state
as a whole can be evaluated by analyzing how it will affect different interest groups. There are seven major interest groups in
Pennsylvania effected by the proposed legislation. Five of these
groups are direct water users whose interests are economic in nature. These groups represent the following areas: agriculture, industry and mining, public water utilities, electric utilities, and
domestic and commercial users. The other two groups are not
water users, but represent the interests of conservationalists and
DER. An evaluation of each group's concerns regarding water
regulation reveals the diversity of the interests involved.
1. Agriculture
Despite the fact that agriculture is a major industry in Pennsylvania, 199 agricultural withdrawals of water total only six-tenths
of one percent of all withdrawals in Pennsylvania. 20 0 However,
the small amount of water that farmers withdraw is not reflective
20
of its importance to the agricultural industry. '
Some farmers are very dependent on irrigation systems to
ensure their financial success. 20 2 Irrigation is often the difference
198. See id. at para. 4. For text of planning provisions, see id.
199. Water Resources Management: Hearings, (Sept. 12, 1991), supra note 155,

at 29 (statement of William Troxell, representative of the Pennsylvania Vegetable Growers Association).
200. Wetzel, supra note 172, at 438. Of this total, eighty-six percent was

withdrawn from surface-water sources. Id.
201. The importance of water to agriculture may be more reflected by the
fact that agricultural use accounts for 12.2% of all consumptive use. Id.
202. Water Resources Managment: Hearings (Sept. 12, 1991), supra note 155, at

30 (statement of William Troxell, representative of Pennsylvania Vegetable
Growers Association). Farmers seek to insure their investment by installing irrigation systems. Id. at 29. Farming is not always profitable in terms of return on
investment. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss2/8

32

Donnelly et al.: Considering Comprehensive Water Legislation: Pennsylvania as a Ca

19921

COMPREHENSIVE WATER LEGISLATION

475

between a profitable and non-profitable year. 2 03 Because farmers
are dependent on irrigation systems, their primary concern in any
proposed legislation is ensuring that their source of water is not
2 04
depleted in drought or water scarcity situations.
Farmers argue it is essential that they receive priority in
drought management allocation systems.2 0 5 Potentially, the agricultural community could achieve this goal by successfully advocating an allocation system based upon public interest or public
benefit. 20 6 Then they could argue that the public interest is best
served through protection of the state's food growers. Therefore,
agriculture should favor an allocation system based on these
priorities.
In addition, many farmers are in favor of regional regulatory
control of water resources rather than centralized control. 2 07 The
agricultural community fears that a centralized authority will not
be responsive to local conditions and economies. 20 8 The difficulty with regional control, however, is that it does not ensure
coordination of labor throughout the state or prevent duplication
20 9
of efforts.
Finally, the agricultural community has concerns about the
administrative components of water regulation. They emphasize
simplifying reporting and registration requirements and avoiding
duplicative effort. 2 10 Specifically, the agricultural community advocates combined applications for the State Regulatory Agency
and the River Basin Commissions and the avoidance of excessive
203. Id. at 30. "Shutting off irrigation water to a farmer for a week or two
. . . could jeopardize the entire year's crop." Id. A farmer cannot "just shut
things down for a week and expect to come back later and [start operating]
where he left off." Id.
204. Id. at 29.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 33. For an outline of different priority allocation systems used in
other states, see Davis, supra note 153, at 450.
207. Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept. 12, 1991), supra note 155, at
32 (statements of William Troxell, representative of Pennsylvania Vegetable
Growers Association).
208. Id.
209. In his testimony, William Troxell emphasized that there is a need to
eliminate duplication of effort between state agencies and the River Basin Commissions. Id. See infra, text accompanying note 210.
210. Id. at 33. It would seem that all parties having to obtain permits
and/or register under a regulated system would advocate simplicity. However,
the agricultural community is the strongest advocate of simplicity because they
have limited resources compared with other water users to deal with complex
compliance issues.
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application fees. 2 1 ' The agricultural community could achieve
this goal by successfully advocating an exemption from permit requirements. 21 2 Such an exemption would allow farmers to continue withdrawing water without a permit.
2.

Public Water Companies

In 1985, water companies accounted for about 11.2% of
water withdrawals in Pennsylvania. 21 3 However, their importance
is much greater than their percentage use. Sixty-nine percent of
2 14
Pennsylvania's population is served by public water supply.
Moreover, many of these uses, such as fire fighting and street
21 5
cleaning, are essential for all citizens.
Currently, water utilities are the only entities that are subject
to statewide regulation.2 1 6 Water utilities are regulated by the
PUC which allows them to earn a reasonable return. 21 7 As such,
they have conflicting interests in comprehensive regulation of
water. On the one hand, utilities are opposed to any regulation
218
that would make obtaining and using water more difficult.
Since utilities are the only entity whose water use is currently regulated in Pennsylvania, the increase in burden will likely be marginal. On the other hand, utilities are in favor of regulation that
would force other water users to face the same regulatory scheme
21 9
that they currently must follow.

Utilities may be indifferent to regulations encouraging and
211. Id. Exactly what constitutes "excessive" application fees is not clear.
Currently, only the water utilities have to pay registration fees.
212. Georgia, Kentucky, and Maryland have exemptions from permit registration for farming. See Davis, supra note 153, at 449 n.103.
213. Wetzel, supra note 172, at 436. Withdrawals for public supply increased from 9.6% of total water withdrawn in 1980 to 11.2% in 1985. Id. The
increase is probably due to the decrease in percentage of self-supplied industrial
and thermoelectric uses. Id. at 436-37.
214. Id. at 437.
215. Id.
216. 1939 Water Rights Act, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 631-41. For an analysis
of that Act, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
217. For a discussion of PUC's functions in Pennsylvania, see supra notes
74-86 and accompanying text.
218. See General Waterworks supra note 179.
219. See id. Profit-wise, the utility companies have no real motive to be concerned that non-water utilities pay the same regulation fees to which they are
subject. Id. They do not compete with non-water utilities. However, there is an
irresistible emotional reaction on the part of water utility officers, which
manifests itself in an argument about fairness, that other water users should
have to bear the same administrative fees and burdens that water utilities do. Id.
Within the water company industry, there is not a complete mutuality of
interest. There are two types of water utilities: investor owned and municipally
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stimulating water conservation. 2 20 Since utilities are guaranteed a
fixed rate of return on their investment, the PUC allows them to
raise rates in order to achieve this. 22 ' Thus, a decreased use of
water will not decrease profits. 2 22 Decreased use will mean that
22 3
all users will pay more per gallon.
3.

Domestic and Commercial Water Users

In Pennsylvania, domestic and commercial water uses account for 937 million gallons per day or 6.6% of all water withdrawn. 2 24 Eighty-six and one half percent of this amount comes
from public water suppliers and 13.5% from self-supplied
sources. 22 5 Because domestic and commercial users vary in their
size and the way in which they obtain water, their interest in water
regulation is among the most difficult to analyze.
For domestic and commercial users who withdraw their own
water, the most important concern is protecting their withdrawal
rights.2 2 6 The small landowner who builds his own well to withdraw water needs protection from future neighbors, businesses,
industrial users, and water suppliers who come along later and
owned. The investor-owned companies are particularly concerned that municipally owned utilities receive the same treatment. Id.
220. This raises an interesting issue if water companies are allowed, or encouraged, to give discounts to those who conserve. This could mean water companies would reward customers who buy less of their product.
221. If a water utility's capital investment is $10 million, and the PUC guarantees them a rate of return of 10%, then the utility will be allowed to charge
prices that will give them the opportunity to earn $1 million in profit. This is
true regardless of whether sales are 100 mgd or a fraction of that, because of
policies encouraging water conservation.
222. General Waterworks supra note 179. Water companies are not guaranteed increased rates in response to every increase in costs. Id. Water companies
are only guaranteed an opportunity to make a reasonable return. What constitutes
an opportunity to make a "reasonable return" for water utilities is a highly debated topic. Id. It has been interpreted to mean that water utilities should be
allowed to charge rates that enable them, if they manage themselves well, a level
of return on investment that the PUC deems appropriate. Id.
223. If the water utilities were guaranteed a fixed profit percentage, rather
than a fixed rate of return, the results would be different. Under this scheme,
decreased use of water would cause decreased revenues, which in turn would
cause decreased profits. However, if the profits continued to be the same percentage of revenues, it would not matter that in absolute terms they had
decreased.
224. Wetzel, supra note 172, at 437. Commercial use represents 22.8% of
total domestic and commercial use. Id.
225. Id.

226. See

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES,

supra note 166. The

state has little authority to protect the water rights of a homeowner whose well
has been sucked dry by a neighbor. Id.
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build larger wells. 2 2 7 Larger wells may drain away the original
228
landowner's water.
However, under comprehensive regulation, a priority allocation system may protect the original well digger from future water
withdrawers. 2 29 Rather than resorting to litigation, under comprehensive regulation a state regulatory agency will determine all
water users' rights in times of drought prospectively. 23 0 If DER's
future proposed legislation places domestic use as a high priority
during drought, many landowners will have their investment in
private wells protected, and will likely support the legislation.
A larger portion of the domestic and commercial users get
their water from public water companies. These users will ultimately pay for a portion of the cost of any new regulation. Increased regulation would most likely be financed through fees for
water withdrawers.231 Water companies will be able to pass on
these costs to users through rate hearings with the PUC.232
4.

Thermoelectric Power Uses

The largest consumptive water users and withdrawers in
Pennsylvania are the electric companies. 2 33 Pennsylvania has
thirty-five thermoelectric facilities, including thirty-one fossil fuel
plants, three nuclear generating facilities, and one hydroelectric
and fossil fueled unit. 23 4 Thermoelectric power uses account for
227. Id. With no regulation or management rules, the biggest pump or
deepest well wins, leaving the small water user with no recourse except litigation. Id.
228. Id. With no regulation, the only rule is that the largest and deepest
pump wins. Id. The original well digger has no recourse except through the
courts. Id. The state has little authority to protect the original well driller. Id.
229. For a discussion on priority water allocation systems, see supra note
168.
230. Although DER has not specified the order of priority uses in a drought
situation, DER's proposal requires the preparation of a State Water Resources
Emergency Plan to include "[p]rioritization or restriction of uses for various
stages of drought." DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166
at para. 4.
231. In the alternative, state taxes could be increased to finance the costs of
the administration of water legislation. However, this would likely draw strong
opposition.
232. For an analysis of water utilities ability to pass on costs to consumers
through hearings with the PUC, see supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.

233. See generally, ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA WATER USE STUDY: WATER-RELATED ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITIES
1991-2005 10-11 (June 1991) [hereinafter ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES OF
PENNSYLVANIA].
234. See Wetzel, supra note 172, at 437.
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seventy-one percent of total water withdrawals in Pennsylvania.2 3 5
However, since power facilities return a significant amount of the
water to its original source, thermoelectric use accounts for only
2 6
thirty-two percent of consumptive water use in Pennsylvania. 3
Due to their dependence on large quantities of water, electric
companies are concerned with the availability of water during
droughts. 23 7 Their concerns are based on issues of increased cost
and disrupted service to customers.2 38 In addition, water used in
electric generation must be relatively free of contaminants such as
iron and silica in order to be adequately processed in a steam
boiler.2 39 Thus, the electric utility industry is not only concerned
with the availability of a large quantity of water, but also the qual240
ity of the water.
In actuality, electric companies would benefit from a regulated system of water allocation. A regulated system which identifies, inventories, and evaluates water resources in Pennsylvania
would provide electric companies with information enabling them
to better react to shortages and changing needs.
5.

Industry

Industrial water use comprised 16.2% of the total water use
in Pennsylvania in 1985.241 This places manufacturing second
only to thermoelectric power generation in the amount of water
used.

24 2

Industries using water can be separated into two categories:
those who have riparian rights by virtue of being adjacent to
water and those who get their water from water companies in the
absence of having riparian rights. Generally, manufacturers that
consume large amounts of water locate themselves near water.
Self-supplied industrial use of water was 2,060 mgd or eighty243
nine percent of all industrial use.
235. Id.
236. Id. Consumptive water use is that water which is not readily returned
to the stream, lake, river, or ground water source from which it was withdrawn.
WATER RESOURCES IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 151.
237. See ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 233, at
12-13.
238. Id. at 12. Like water utilities, electric companies are regulated by the
PUC. See supra notes 74-86.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

WATER RESOUCES IN PENNSYLVANIA,

supra note 20, at 152.

Id.
Wetzel, supra note 172, at 437.
Id.
Id.
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The consequences of regulation are that industrial users
which have riparian rights would now have to register and pay
required fees where they did not in the past. Industrial users
which receive water from public suppliers would be affected only
if the fees currently charged to utilities were raised. Thus, they
would be similarly situated to most domestic and commercial
users.
6.

Conservationalists

Conservationalists are concerned with the quality and maintenance of water in Pennsylvania.2 4 4 They are not just concerned
with water quality, but also with water quantity. They are concerned with ensuring an adequate quantity of water to protect,
conserve, and enhance water for fish and aquatic life. 2 4 5 As such,
they are most concerned with regulatory authority for groundwater and surface withdrawals. 2 4 6 Conservationists have called
upon DER to be more comprehensive in the proposal to regulate
more than just large withdrawals.2 4 7 It is noted that a small withdrawal from a small stream may have a more damaging impact, in
terms of causing a loss of flow, than a large withdrawal from a
large stream.2 48 However, only the large withdrawals would be
24 9
regulated under DER's proposals.
7. DER
Under DER's proposal to the Pennsylvania Legislature, DER
would be the primary administrative body for the regulation and
would be given more authority to regulate water in Pennsylvania
than it currently holds. This authority would make DER's en244. There are a number of groups who are concerned with the conservation of our water resources independent of their individual interests. Included
in this group are the Green Valleys Association, Pennsylvania Association of
Conservation Districts, the League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania and private citizens.

Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept. 19, 1991), supra note

155, at 4-17 (statement of John Brunner, Green Valleys Association), 64-68
(statement of Duane Clarke, Public Director of Montgomery County District,
Pennsylvania Association of Conservation Districts), 75-79 (statement of Betty
Conner, Natural Resources Director, League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania), 80-86 (statement of Carl Webber, private citizen). For purposes of
simplicity, the interests of these groups and those similarly situated will be categorized as conservationalists.
245. Water Resources Management: Hearings (Sept. 27, 1991), supra note 155 at
30 (testimony of Leroy Young, Biologist, Pennsylvania Fish Commission).

246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. For the text of the administrative provisions, see supra note 175.
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forcement of provisions much easier. For example, many states
have problems with diverters who refuse to obtain a permit or fail
to comply with the requirements of the permit. 2 50 Lack of compliance is generally blamed upon the lack of enforcement or lack
251
of penalty provisions.
However, balanced against these potential benefits is the
concern that DER, in attempting to grant power to itself through
comprehensive water legislation, is itself a special interest group.
In other words, since the proposal directly affects the growth and
scope of DER as an administrative agency, DER has a special interest in the proposal. Consequently, many water users view the
proposed legislation as DER's attempt to seize additional power
and control. Water companies and industry particularly question
the blanket authority given to DER in special management areas
and in water emergencies. These interests foresee DER in the
position of making decisions for them in times of drought. Independent businesses will reject the idea that DER is capable of
making decisions in their company's best interest.
DER argues that comprehensive legislation provides them
with the tools to carry out what is necessary for proper water allocation in Pennsylvania. 252 Moreover, it provides all users with
predictability about when they can use water. DER would most
likely receive more support for the proposal if it did not vest itself
2 53
with so much power.
V.

RECOMMENDATION

In Pennsylvania, the adoption of a comprehensive water regulation is dependent upon the careful tailoring of controversial
provisions. 254 DER must balance the value of each provision
against the objections of particular interest groups. Some provisions of comprehensive water regulation in Pennsylvania would
benefit all interested parties. 25 5 However, it is just as apparent
that the inclusion of certain provisions in a proposed statute
250. See Davis, supra note 153, at 462.
251. Id.
252. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, supra note 166.
253. See Telephone Interview with Tom Fidler, supra note 166.
254. The provisions of DER's proposal can be categorized into three
groups: those likely to receive strong opposition, those unlikely to receive opposition, and those which fall into a gray area in which the opposition will be determined by the content of the provisions.
255. This group of provisions includes those to which virtually no interest
group will object. Most notable among these provisions are the planning provisions by DER. Generally, no interest group will object to such provisions to the
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threatens the passage of the whole legislation. 2 56 DER and legislators are faced with a choice: they can advocate ideal, all-inclusive legislation and risk rejection based upon pressure from
interest groups, or they can include only those regulations to
which virtually no interest group will object.
The importance of comprehensive water law legislation necessitates compromise. As Pennsylvania and similarly situated riparian states develop economically and more demands are placed
upon their water resources, pressures will build to find better
ways to allocate the resource. Without an efficient and effective
water allocation program, states risk exploitation and degradation
of their water resources.
Basil S. Donnelly
Stephan A. Hartman
Cathleen M. Stryker
extent that the provisions do not require additional work on their part. For text
of planning provisions, see supra note 176.
256. This group of provisions is likely to receive strong opposition from
one or more interest groups, thereby threatening the passage of the whole legislation. The provisions that fall into this category are those that allocate broad
authority to DER without specifying details or limits on that authority. For the
text of these management provisions, see supra note 174. Virtually all interest
groups have an interest in controlling their own use of water and have doubts
about whether another entity, specifically DER, could successfully take on that
responsibility.
There are provisions which could go either way depending on their content.
That is, unless those provisions are carefully tailored to meet the needs of various interest groups, certain groups may raise objections. Most notable among
such provisions are the administrative regulations regarding registration, fees,
and permitting. See supra note 175 for the text of the proposed administrative
provisions.
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